Khalil Hamra/Associated Press
Updated: Sept. 14, 2012
Recent Developments
Sept. 14 Following a blunt phone call from President Obama, Egyptian leaders scrambled to try to repair the country’s alliance with Washington, tacitly acknowledging that they erred in their response to the attack on the United States Embassy.
Sept. 13 As crowds surged around the American Embassy in Cairo for third day of protests over a video insulting Islam, Obama administration officials were clearly troubled by the tepid responseof Mohamed Morsi’s new Islamist government.
Sept. 11 In Cairo, demonstrators angry over an amateurish American-made video denouncing Islam scaled the fortified walls of the United States Embassy and destroyed a flag hanging inside. The mobs were set off by Egyptian media reports about a 14-minute trailer for a video, called “Innocence of Muslims,” that was released on the Web.
Sept. 3 The Obama administration said that it was nearing an agreement with Egypt’s government to relieve $1 billion of its debtas part of an American and international assistance package. In addition to the debt assistance, the administration threw its support behind a $4.8 billion loan being negotiated between Egypt and theInternational Monetary Fund.
Aug. 30 Speaking at the Nonaligned Movement summit meeting in Iran, Mr. Morsi denounced the repression of the armed uprising inSyria, a close Iranian ally. He compared the uprising in Syria to those that swept out regimes in North Africa.
Aug. 12 President Morsi forced the retirement of his powerful defense minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi; the army chief of staff, Sami Anan; and several senior generals. The purge seemed to reclaim for civilian leaders much of the political power the Egyptian military had seized since the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Mr. Morsi also named a senior judge, Mahmoud Mekki, as his vice-president.
Overview
Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world, and its revolution in February 2011 was the capstone event of the Arab Spring, inspiring demonstrators in Libya, Syria and elsewhere.
But in June 2012, a series of events threw the country’s troubled transition to democracy deeper into confusion as Egypt’s two most powerful forces — the military establishment and the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group — moved toward a showdown. A swift series of steps by the military and its allies in the judiciary left many observers in Egypt and the West wondering if they were witnessing a subtle military coup, or even a counterrevolution.
Then, in August, President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood forced the retirement of his powerful defense minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi; the army chief of staff, Sami Anan; and several senior generals. The stunning purge seemed for the moment to reclaim for civilian leaders much of the political power the Egyptian military had seized since the fall of Hosni Mubarak.
As Mr. Morsi consolidated power, American officials began to raise concerns about the role an Islamist Egypt might play in the region, even as President Obama announced the forgiveness of $1 billion in Egyptian debt.
Then in September, outrage in the Egyptian media over an anti-Islamic film boiled over when an angry crowd breached the fortified walls of the American Embassy in Cairo. While the attack did not lead to American deaths, as in Libya, the response of Mr. Morsi and his government troubled American officials.
Mr. Morsi issued only a mild rebuke of the rioters — and on Facebook — while his movement, the Muslim Brotherhood,called for more protests. And though the Egyptian police coordinated with American officials, Mr. Morsi waited 24 hours before issuing his statement against the militants who stormed the embassy.
But even as demonstrations continued, the official tone changed abruptly after a blunt phone call to Mr. Morsi from President Obama, who warned that relations would be jeopardized if Egyptian authorities failed to protect American diplomats and stand more firmly against anti-American attacks.
The rising breach between the United States and Egypt comes at a critical time for the longtime allies. For the Obama administration, it is a test of whether it has succeeded in efforts to shore up influence after the uprising that toppled Hosni Mubarak and to find common ground with the new Islamist leaders of a country that is a linchpin of American policy in the Middle East.
For Egypt’s new president, the dilemma quickly became an early test of the Brotherhood’s ability to balance domestic political pressures, international commitments and its conservative religious mandate now that it is also effectively governing in a new democracy.
The Brotherhood also shifted gears, responding belatedly with a televised presidential address, a letter to the editor in The New York Times by its top strategist, and a series of sympathetic online messages aimed at mollifying American officials.
After decades focused on disciplining its own cadre to survive underground, the Brotherhood’s leadership is still adjusting to the competing constituencies and high visibility of democratic life.
For decades, the Brotherhood had been the primary opposition to the military dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. When the unrest of the Arab Spring came to Egypt in January 2011, it was young liberal activists who ignited the protests, but it was the Brotherhood’s decision to join that gave them critical mass. Yet it was the military that ousted Mr. Mubarak the following month and took direct control.
The generals were hailed initially as the nation’s heroes, a feeling that gradually turned to dismay as questions arose over whether they truly intended to hand over power. How much power they will retain under Mr. Morsi is still a looming question for the country — as is to what extent the Brotherhood will pursue the Islamist agenda it has historically offered, or uphold the religious tolerance it promised after the revolution?
Background: Before the Revolution
Egypt is a heavyweight in Middle East diplomacy, in part because of its peace treaty with Israel, and as a key ally of the United States. The country, often the fulcrum on which currents in the region turn, also has one of the largest and most sophisticated security forces in the Middle East.
Hosni Mubarak, ousted from office in February 2011, had been president of Egypt since the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat in October 1981. (Mr. Mubarak had served as Mr. Sadat’s vice president.) Until the recent unrest, Mr. Mubarak had firmly resisted calls to name a successor. He had also successfully negotiated complicated issues of regional security, solidified a relationship with Washington, maintained cool but correct ties with Israel and sharply suppressed Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism — along with dissent in general.
The litany of complaints against Mr. Mubarak’s autocratic rule was well known to anyone who has spent time in any city in Egypt. The police were brutal. Elections were rigged. Corruption was rampant. Life was getting harder for the masses as the rich grew richer and the poor grew poorer. Even as Egypt’s economy enjoyed record growth in recent years, the number of people living in poverty actually grew.
While Mr. Mubarak’s regime had become increasingly unpopular, the public long seemed mired in apathy. For years, the main opposition to his rule appeared to be the Muslim Brotherhood, which was officially banned but still commanded significant support.
In 2010, speculation rose as to whether Mr. Mubarak, who had undergone gall bladder surgery that year and appeared increasingly frail, would run in the 2011 elections or seek to install his son Gamal as a successor. Mohamed ElBaradei, former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, publicly challenged Mr. Mubarak in the election but drew little support. The Mubarak political machine had steamrolled its way to its regular lopsided victory in a parliamentary vote.
A Police State
Egypt’s police bureaucracy reached into virtually every aspect of public life. Police officers directed traffic and investigated murders, but also monitored elections and issued birth and death certificates and passports. In a large, impoverished nation, the services the police provided gave them wide — and, critics said, unchecked — power.
The police have a long and notorious track record of torture and cruelty to average citizens. The Mubarak government for decades maintained what it called an Emergency Law, passed first in 1981 to combat terrorism after the assassination of Mr. Sadat. The law allowed the police to arrest people without charge, detain prisoners indefinitely, limit freedom of expression and assembly and maintain a special security court.
In 2010, the government promised that it would only use the law to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, but terrorism was defined so broadly as to render that promise largely meaningless, according to human rights activists and political prisoners.
Revolution: End of the Mubarak Era
When the uprising, inspired by the revolution in Tunisia, began on Jan. 25, 2011, the anger fueling it was not new. It had beenseething beneath the surface for many years, exploding at times, but never before in such widespread, sustained fury. The grievances were economic, social, historic and deeply personal. Egyptians often speak of their dignity, which many said was wounded by Mr. Mubarak’s monopoly on power, his iron-fisted approach to security and corruption that had been allowed to fester. Even government allies and insiders were quick to acknowledge that the protesters had legitimate grievances that needed to be addressed.
After 18 days of massive public demonstrations against Mr. Mubarak’s rule, more than 800 unarmed people were thought to have been killed by the police. Mr. Mubarak lost the support of his military, which promised to protect the demonstrators. On Feb. 11, 2011, he resigned and turned power over to the military.
In August 2011, Mr. Mubarak was wheeled into a courtroom cage on a hospital bed to stand trial, charged with corruption and complicity in the killing of those protestors. It was a sight that few Egyptians could have imagined as the year began, and that many had doubted they would ever see.
In June 2012, he was found guilty of being an accessory to murder for failing to stop the killing of unarmed demonstrators during the uprising in January 2011 that ended his rule. He was sentenced to life in prison. His sentence was met by several days of angry demonstrations by tens of thousands in Cairo and around Egypt who said it was not harsh enough.
An Ailing Economy
Since the revolution, Egypt’s most important sources of income have remained steady, with tourism the notable exception. The other pillars of the economy — gas and oil sales, Suez Canal revenues and remittances from workers abroad — are either stable or growing, according to Central Bank figures.
But those sources of income accomplished little more than propping up an ailing economy. Over all, economic activity came to a standstill for months, with growth falling to under 2 percent in 2011 from a robust 7 percent in 2010. Official unemployment rates rose to at least 12 percent from 9 percent. Foreign investment was negligible.
Part of the blame for Egypt’s economic malaise rested with its caretaker cabinet. The ministers, mindful that several businessmen who served in the Mubarak government sit in jail on corruption convictions, were reluctant to sign off on new projects.
Military Power Play as Morsi Wins the Presidency
The Brotherhood was the clear winner in the parliamentary elections that ended in January 2012, holding roughly half of the seats. In March, the Brotherhood reneged on a promise not to seek the presidency. Its initial candidate was rejected by the courts on the basis of a Mubarak-era conviction, and the party’s back-up candidate, Mohamed Morsi, took his place.
In May, in the first round of voting, the winners were Mr. Morsi and Ahmed Shafik, a retired Air Force general who had been Mr. Mubarak’s final prime minister. Mr. Shafik campaigned on promises to bring back law and order and to rein in “dark forces,’' a reference to Islamists. Liberals and secular activists, who had split their votes among two failed candidates, despaired at finding themselves caught between the military and religious conservatives.
In June, days before the final presidential runoff, the military and its allies on the judiciary took steps that critics charged amounted to a coup. The military council ordered the Islamist Parliament dissolved after the court ruled that the law under which it had been elected was partly unconstitutional. In the same stroke, the military assumed legislative power and severely limited the authority of the presidency.
The charter the generals issued gave them control of all laws and the national budget, immunity from any oversight and the power to veto a declaration of war. The generals also seized control of the process of writing a permanent constitution.
When the polls closed on June 17, independent observers said that Mr. Morsi had narrowly won. But it was not until June 24 that the nation’s election commission confirmed that he was the official winner, handing the Islamist group a symbolic triumph and a new weapon in its struggle for power with the ruling military council. According to the commission, Mr. Morsi won 51.7 percent of the runoff vote and Mr. Shafik won 48.3 percent.
On July 8, Mr. Morsi unexpectedly ordered that Parliament reconvene, in a direct challenge to the military and to the courts, which the next day both reaffirmed their actions in dissolving the body.
In late July, Mr. Morsi named Hesham Kandil as prime minister.Mr. Kandil, who is known as a religious Muslim but is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was plucked from relative obscurity. The American-educated engineer headed the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation under the interim cabinet appointed by the Egyptian military.
Morsi Ousts Military Chief
On Aug. 12, President Morsi forced the retirement of his powerful defense minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi; the army chief of staff, Sami Anan; and several senior generals. The stunning purge seemed for the moment to reclaim for civilian leaders much of the political power the Egyptian military had seized since the fall of Mr. Mubarak.
Mr. Morsi appeared to look to the support of a junior officer corps that blamed the old guard for a litany of problems within the military and for involving the armed forces too deeply in the country’s politics. They included Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, whom Mr. Morsi named as Field Marshal Tantawi’s replacement.
Mr. Morsi also nullified the constitutional declaration, issued by the military before he was elected, that eviscerated the powers of the presidency and arrogated to the military the right to enact laws. It was not immediately clear whether he had the constitutional authority to cancel that decree.
Mr. Morsi also named a senior judge, Mahmoud Mekki, as his vice-president. During the Mubarak era, Mr. Mekki fought for judicial independence and spoke out frequently against voting fraud.
Morsi’s First Crisis: An Attack in the Sinai
On Aug. 5, masked gunmen opened fire on an Egyptian Army checkpoint in the northern Sinai Peninsula, killing 15 soldiers who were preparing to break their Ramadan fast. The gunmen then seized at least one armored vehicle and headed toward Israel, apparently in an attempt to storm the border, witnesses and officials said. An Israeli military spokesman said a vehicle exploded at the border, and another was struck by the Israeli Air Force at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, on the southern tip of the Gaza Strip. It was the deadliest assault on Egyptian soldiers in recent memory.
The killings of the Egyptian soldiers, which represented Mr. Morsi’s first real crisis, aggravated the political clash between the Muslim Brotherhood, on one side, and its more secular rivals, including Egypt’s military leaders.
Mr. Morsi abruptly canceled plans to attend the funeral of the 16 soldiers after protesters shouting anti-Brotherhood slogans chased the country’s prime minister from an earlier prayer service. Mr. Morsi’s vulnerability stemmed from his closeness with Hamas, an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that governs the Gaza Strip. He had promised to ease restrictions on Gaza by opening the border crossing and allowing goods, now smuggled, to pass through the border.
After the attack, some of Mr. Morsi’s critics cast his relationship with Hamas as a liability. Officials said that militants based in the Sinai carried out the attack, along with Palestinians who infiltrated the country through smuggling tunnels from the Gaza Strip. Though attention had been focused on the smuggling tunnels, many analysts said Sinai itself is a more pressing source of concern as a place where militancy has taken hold after years of neglect by the government and heavy-handed treatment by the security services.
Three days after the attack, Egypt was reported to have launched its first airstrikes in decades in the Sinai Peninsula, deploying attack helicopters to strike at gunmen.
U.S. and Egypt Step Up Talks on Security
In the wake of the attack in the Sinai, the United States and Egypt were negotiating a package of assistance to address what administration officials described as a worsening security vacuum in the Sinai Peninsula.
President Morsi balked in July when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta each separately pressed him to act more aggressively against extremists operating in Sinai. But after the attack, Egypt appeared to have overcome its sensitivities about sovereignty and accelerated talks over the details of new American assistance, including military equipment, police training, and electronic and aerial surveillance, administration officials said.
While the American military has long had ties to its Egyptian counterpart, a deeper effort could bind the United States and Egypt more closely against the shared threat of extremism. It could also overcome reservations among some in Washington about Mr. Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization long reviled by American officials for its anti-Western views and Islamist politics.
Compounding American concerns, the officials added, is the presence of an international peacekeeping force in Sinai that includes about 700 American soldiers. The force is not authorized to fight extremists and is not part of the discussions on expanded assistance, but its troops and civilians have encountered the lawlessness in the region, including the threat of kidnappings.
Morsi’s Cabinet Includes Many Holdovers
In early August, Mr. Morsi swore in members of his first cabinet,marking another milestone in the country’s difficult transition even as reports of deadly violence complicated the new government’s work.
The makeup of the cabinet, which includes longtime state employees and at least six former government ministers, has lowered expectations of a sweeping change in governance that was the promise of last year’s revolt.
The selection of five ministers from Mr. Morsi’s party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the exclusion of cabinet members from other major political parties seemed likely to revive complaints that the Brotherhood was seeking to dominate Egypt’s new politics. And, despite promises of an inclusive government, only two women were chosen for the cabinet — and one of them was its only Christian member.
In selecting technocrats, rather than high-profile appointees from across the political spectrum, Mr. Morsi and his prime minister, Mr. Kandil, showed a preference for cautious — and incremental — change as they face a series of mounting crises.
One appointment, though, represented a bold stroke. In naming Ahmed Mekky, a longtime activist for judicial independence, as justice minister, Mr. Morsi and his prime minister seemed to be taking on Egypt’s most powerful judges, whose reputation for politicized decisions has emerged as one of the primary challenges to Mr. Morsi’s leadership.
Two of the 35 ministers are women, and only one is a Coptic Christian, state media reported. Christians make up roughly 10 percent of the population.
Islamists Tread Lightly, But Skeptics Squirm
On the surface, Mr. Morsi seems to have gone out of his way to allay fears that Islamists would radically change Egyptian society. He promptly fulfilled a campaign promise to resign from the Brotherhood and its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, and chose a prime minister, Hesham Kandil, who is a religious Muslim but known as a technocrat rather than a hard-liner.
Mr. Morsi met early with the acting Coptic pope, Anba Bakhomious, though during the election campaign he had said he did not believe a Christian or a woman could ever be president of Egypt. He went out of his way to praise the role of the military as guarantors of Egypt’s new democracy.
He has refrained from taking any action on hot-button social or foreign policy issues, or even discussing them. The sale and consumption of alcohol remain legal, a concern of the important tourist industry, which has been on the rocks since the revolution. No one in ruling circles is calling for the government to make wearing head scarves obligatory, ban pop music or review the peace treaty with Israel.
Even so, Mr. Morsi and his Brotherhood allies have had little luck placating secular and other opponents. The Brotherhood remains reviled and feared by secular activists and many Christians, who make up 10 percent of the population.
Many secular and Christian Egyptians, even some who participated in the revolution, have looked to the military as a guarantor against Islamist excess. And many express the belief that the only reason the Brotherhood has not taken any action on social issues is because it is biding its time until it is powerful enough to do so.
Staking Out a Leadership Role on Syria
Attempting to stake out a new leadership role for Egypt in the shaken landscape of the Arab uprisings, President Morsi reached out to Iran and other regional powers in August 2012 an initiative to halt the escalating violence in Syria.
The initiative, centered on a committee of four that would also include Turkey and Saudi Arabia, was the first foreign policy priority taken up by Mr. Morsi. Its focus bisects Washington’s customary division of the region, between Western-friendly states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran on the other.
Following failed efforts by the Arab League and United Nations to stop Syria’s descent into civil war, Mr. Morsi’s plan set a notably assertive and independent course for an Egypt that is still sorting out its own transition. But although it involves collaboration with American rivals, Mr. Morsi’s initiative seemed largely harmonious with the stated Western objective of ending the Syrian bloodshed.
Egypt also attended the Nonaligned Movement summit meeting in Iran in late August. As one of the featured speakers, Mr. Morsi compared the uprising in Syria to those that swept out regimes in North Africa. Step down while you can, he said in a message to the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad.
On Sept. 5, Mr. Morsi further warned President Assad that “your time won’t be long.” His warning came days after the top Syrian government spokesman said that the only change in Cairo since the ouster last year of Hosni Mubarak was Mr. Morsi’s beard.
U.S. Prepares to Cut $1 Billion From Egypt’s Debt
In early September 2012, the Obama administration said that it was nearing an agreement with Egypt’s government to relieve $1 billion of its debt as part of an American and international assistance package. In addition to the debt assistance, the administration has thrown its support behind a $4.8 billion loanbeing negotiated between Egypt and the International Monetary Fund.
The assistance underscored the importance of shoring up Egypt at a time of turmoil and change across the Middle East. Given Egypt’s influence in the Arab world, Obama administration officials said, its economic recovery and political stability could have a profound influence on other nations in transition and ease wariness in Israel about the tumultuous political changes under way.
Egypt’s economy is increasingly precarious, with dwindling foreign-exchange reserves and nagging unemployment. The instability that followed the toppling of Mr. Mubarak devastated tourism, one of the country’s greatest sources of foreign currency.
Egypt’s debt to the United States exceeds $3 billion, most of it from a program called Food for Peace that offered loans to buy American agricultural products after the Camp David peace accords with Israel during the Carter administration. The $1 billion in debt relief proposed by Mr. Obama has been cobbled together from unspent money from assistance programs.
h/t RUSH Limbaugh
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